Peace Jirga et al

8 June 8, 2010

The one concrete decision to emerge from the jirga that has seen immediate implementation is the decision to release all Taliban prisoners who have been imprisoned on the basis of false proof or against whom there is no evidence. While this has been projected as a gesture of good will and a concrete evidence of the respect of the Afghan president towards the jirga decisions, what in reality, does it constitute?
The release of prisoners from detention centers was already underway under various schemes and review boards that were reviewing the detentions on a case by case basis. Setting up a High Commission seems to be merely a way to put a new label on an existing practice in the name of the jirga.
Faced with persistent and critical questioning the presidential spokesman Waheed Omar insisted that no Taliban were being released and that the Commission would only separate those who had been incarcerated without adequate grounds. Seems like that ought to be a gesture of rule of law and justice rather than ‘goodwill’ as is being projected but presumably even justice is a gesture of goodwill in this climate!

While much of the jirga declaration’s intent will lie in actual implementation, what was interesting was to see the issue that got prioritized by the participants. A quick count of the recommendations of the individual committees- going by the twitters – reveals these to be most popular demands: more curbs on international forces, tackling corruption in government, freeing prisoners, the UN blacklist and the (negative/positive role of neighboring countries).
Those of the committees’ recommendations that did not make it onto the resolution include a call for a ceasefire and legalizing the international forces. Will the resolution have any impact on the ongoing conflict; operations of international forces etc? Difficult to say. Apart from the unanimous resolution there are as many as 260 recommendations made by the 28 committees which are to be included as part of the outcome of the jirga and the final declaration states that these should be considered part and parcel of the jirga findings and included in the formulation of the peace plan. So what happens to the earlier peace plan formulated by the government? Well a plan to make a plan to make a committee for a plan for a conference for a strategy for a plan for a programme … is the way it goes here. But back to the 260 recommendations. Farooq Wardak says they will have the same sanctity as the unanimous declaration – so that gives the government a great deal of leeway to cherry pick individual elements that suit it. Will these be 260 recommendations be made public? When?

Meanwhile, rumours abound in town about the removal of Amrullah Saleh and Hanif Atmar with the long hand of Pakistan being seen by many. Was their removal part of the real concessions and goodwill gestures towards the Opposition? Or did Karzai just use the timing to get rid of longtime irritants? Whatever the issue, the public deconstruction of the entire episode just did not hang together. If the breach of security on the first day of the jirga was such a serious issue, how is it the same security apparatus or same faulty intelligence was allowed to continue with no interruption and risk the delegates on the second and third day? Why is there no high level inquiry into the breach of security? Why did the government commend the quick action to the attack the first day? Would they have really risked Karzai going into the tent on the third day is security had been substantially compromised the first day? In the annals of security breaches in Kabul, the jirga episode came across as a success since no civilian or for that matter security force personnel lost their lives. But it has certainly become the raison de etre for the subsequent purge. How far the purge will percolate into the organisation and who steps in to take their place may say more about their removal than the current wisdom in the market place.